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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-2319 
 ___________ 
 
 ARCHIE TINDELL, 




 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; 
 DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; 
 SECRETARY JEFFREY A. BEARD; 
 SCI PINE GROVE; 
 FACILITY MANAGER BARRY J. JOHNSON; 
 NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY JAIL 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 10-0689) 
 District Judge:  Honorable James M. Munley 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
 October 21, 2010 
 
 Before:  BARRY, FISHER and STAPLETON , Circuit Judges 
 







 Pro se appellant Archie Tindell, an inmate at Northumberland County Prison, 
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appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).  We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over the District 
Court’s order.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  For the reasons 
detailed below, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 In his complaint, Tindell alleged that Jeffrey Beard, the secretary of 
Pennsylvania’s Department of Corrections; Barry Johnson, the facility manager of SCI-
Pine Grove; Ray Johnson, the warden of Northumberland County Prison; and Anthony 
Rosini, the district attorney of Northumberland County, conspired to charge him with 
assaulting another inmate and wrongly used that charge to keep him incarcerated beyond 
the expiration of his maximum term of imprisonment.1  According to Tindell, in 2008, he 
was charged by criminal complaint with assault.  Upon the subsequent completion of his 
initial sentence (which he was serving at Pine Grove), rather than being released, he was 
transferred to Northumberland — where his assault charge was (and is) pending.  Tindell 
claimed that the criminal complaint, transfer, and pretrial detention were procedurally 
and substantively invalid.  He asserted claims of false imprisonment and malicious 
prosecution under 28 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as various state law claims, and sought both 
release from Northumberland and money damages.  He also filed a motion to proceed in 
                                                 
1 Although Tindell listed the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s Department  of 
Corrections (DOC) in the caption of his complaint, the parties enumerated above are 
the only ones that Tindell demanded relief from and listed in the “parties” section of 
the complaint.  In any event, under the Eleventh Amendment, states and state agencies 
are immune from suit in federal court.  See, e.g., Lavia v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 224 F.3d 
190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000).  Accordingly, any claim against the DOC is barred by the  
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forma pauperis.   
 The District Court granted Tindell’s in forma pauperis motion, but then dismissed 
the complaint sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).  The Court held that Tindell’s 
claims against Rosini failed because Rosini was entitled to absolute immunity for his role 
in prosecuting Tindell.  The Court concluded that Tindell had failed to state a claim 
against Barry Johnson, Ray Johnson, and Beard for two reasons.  First, the Court held 
that Tindell’s complaint as to those appellees did not allege the requisite personal 
involvement in the alleged misconduct, but instead improperly sought to impose liability 
solely due to their supervisory roles in the prison system.  Second, the Court held that 
Tindell failed to plead his conspiracy claim with sufficient particularity.  The Court also 
dismissed Tindell’s claim seeking immediate release, concluding that that remedy was 
available only through habeas corpus proceedings and not under § 1983.  Finally, the 
Court concluded that any amendment would be futile and thus dismissed the complaint 
without leave to amend. 
 We conclude that the District Court was correct to dismiss Tindell’s complaint.  
To the extent, if any, that Tindell seeks release from detention, he advances no 
cognizable § 1983 claim but is instead asserting a claim that properly lies within the 
realm of habeas corpus.  See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 n.14 (1973); see 
also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005). 
Tindell’s claims against Rosini also fail.  It is well established that prosecutors 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 Eleventh Amendment.    
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sued under § 1983 enjoy absolute immunity for their conduct in “initiating a prosecution 
and in presenting the State’s case.”  Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976).  This 
immunity extends to any acts the prosecutor undertakes “as the state’s ‘advocate,’” Yarris 
v. County of Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 136 (3d Cir. 2006), and is not defeated by 
allegations that the prosecutor acted in bad faith, see Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs., 108 
F.3d 486, 502 (3d Cir. 1997), or “commit[ted] perjury or falsifie[d] evidence,” Davis v. 
Grusemeyer, 996 F.2d 617, 630 n.27 (3d Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds by Rolo 
v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644 (3d Cir. 1998).  Therefore, Rosini 
is entitled to absolute immunity for his decision to file a criminal complaint against 
Tindell.  See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 421.  Rosini is similarly immune from liability for his 
role (after the criminal complaint was filed against Tindell) in transferring Tindell to 
Northumberland in anticipation of his state trial.  See Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 
F.3d 1139, 1150 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that prosecutor is entitled to immunity for his 
involvement in the transfer of a prisoner in federal custody to state custody for purposes 
of attending trial in state court).  Therefore, Tindell has failed to state a cognizable claim 
against Rosini. 
Further, although Tindell has named Jeffrey Beard, Barry Johnson, and Roy 
Johnson as defendants, he has failed to allege that those parties were personally involved 
in the alleged misconduct.  Instead, he seeks to hold them liable solely on the basis of 
their supervisory positions.  See Compl. at 2 (claiming that Beard “is legally responsible 
for the overall operations of all correctional facilities” in Pennsylvania); id. (claiming that 
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Barry Johnson “is legally responsible for the overall operation[,] care, custody and 
control of all prisoners housed” at Pine Grove); id. (claiming that Roy Johnson “is legally 
responsible for the overall operation” of Northumberland).  However, “[a] defendant in a 
civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot 
be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.”  Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 
F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).  Thus, Tindell’s theory as to these defendants is not 
cognizable under § 1983.    
Finally, we discern no error in the District Court’s determination that amendment 
to the complaint would be futile.  Tindell’s claim against Rosini fails as a legal matter, 
and his allegations against the other defendants rely on an invalid theory.  We note also 
that Tindell has not elaborated upon these allegations in his informal brief, but has 
instead merely reiterated his deficient claims.  Therefore, we conclude that the District 
Court did not err in refusing to permit amendment.2     
 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
  
                                                 
2 In light of Tindell’s failure to state a viable claim for relief under federal law, we 
understand the District Court to have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over Tindell’s state law claims.  Such a course was within the Court’s discretion.  See 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 181 (3d Cir. 
1999).  We note, however, that this dismissal is without prejudice to Tindell’s right to 
re-file in state court.  See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 650 (3d Cir. 2009).   
